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	 After booming the first half of this decade, U.S. housing activity has retrenched 
sharply. Single-family building permits have plunged 52 percent and existing-home sales 
have declined 30 percent since their September 2005 peaks (Chart 1). 
  A rise in mortgage interest rates that began in the summer of 2005 contributed 
to the housing market’s initial weakness. By late 2006, though, some signs pointed to 
renewed stability. They proved short-lived as loan-quality problems sparked a tightening 
of credit standards on mortgages, particularly for newer and riskier products. As lenders 
cut back, housing activity began to falter again in spring 2007, accompanied by addi-
tional rises in delinquencies and foreclosures. Late-summer financial-market turmoil 
prompted further toughening of mortgage credit standards.
  The recent boom-to-bust housing cycle raises important questions. Why did 
it occur, and what role did subprime lending play? How is the retrenchment in lending 
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activity affecting housing markets, and 
will it end soon? Is the housing slow-
down spilling over into the broader 
economy? 
 
Rise of Nontraditional Mortgages
  Monitoring housing today entails 
tracking an array of mortgage prod-
ucts. In the past few years, a fast-
growing market seized upon such 
arrangements as “option ARMs,” “no-
doc interest-onlys” and “zero-downs 
with a piggyback.” For our purposes, 
it’s sufficient to distinguish among 
prime, jumbo, subprime and near-
prime mortgages.
  Prime mortgages are the tradi-
tional—and still most prevalent—type 
of loan. These go to borrowers with 
good credit, who make traditional 
down payments and fully document 
their income. Jumbo loans are gener-
ally of prime quality, but they exceed 
the $417,000 ceiling for mortgages 
that can be bought and guaranteed by 
government-sponsored enterprises. 
  Subprime mortgages are extended 
to applicants deemed the least credit- 
worthy because of low credit scores 
or uncertain income prospects, both of 
skip payments by reducing equity or, 
in some cases, obtain a mortgage that 
exceeded the home’s value.
  These new practices opened 
the housing market to millions of 
Americans, pushing the homeowner-
ship rate from 63.8 percent in 1994 
to a record 69.2 percent in 2004. 
Although low interest rates bolstered 
homebuying early in the decade, the 
expansion of nonprime mortgages 
clearly played a role in the surge of 
homeownership. 
  Two crucial developments 
spurred nonprime mortgages’ rapid 
growth. First, mortgage lenders adopt-
ed the credit-scoring techniques first 
used in making subprime auto loans. 
With these tools, lenders could better 
sort applicants by creditworthiness and 
offer them appropriately risk-based 
loan rates. 
  By itself, credit scoring couldn’t 
have fostered the rapid growth of 
nonprime lending. Banks lack the 
equity capital needed to hold large 
volumes of these risky loans in their 
portfolios. And lenders of all types 
couldn’t originate and then sell these 
loans to investors in the form of resi-
dential mortgage-backed securities, 
or RMBS—at least not without added 
protection against defaults.
  The spread of new products offer-
ing default protection was the second 
crucial development that fostered sub-
prime lending growth. Traditionally, 
banks made prime mortgages funded 
with deposits from savers. By the 
1980s and 1990s, the need for deposits 
had eased as mortgage lenders created 
a new way for funds to flow from sav-
ers and investors to prime borrowers 
through government-sponsored enter-
prises (GSEs) (Chart 2, upper panel). 
  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
the largest GSEs, with Ginnie Mae 
being smaller. These enterprises guar-
antee the loans and pool large groups 
of them into RMBS. They’re then sold 
to investors, who receive a share of 
the payments on the underlying mort-
gages. Because the GSEs are feder-
ally chartered, investors perceive an 
which reflect the highest default risk 
and warrant the highest interest rates. 
Near-prime mortgages, which are 
smaller than jumbos, are made to bor-
rowers who qualify for credit a notch 
above subprime but may not be able 
to fully document their income or pro-
vide traditional down payments. Most 
mortgages in the near-prime category 
are securitized in so-called Alternative-
A, or Alt-A, pools. 
  Some 80 percent of outstanding 
U.S. mortgages are prime, while 14 
percent are subprime and 6 percent 
fall into the near-prime category. 
These numbers, however, mask the 
explosive growth of nonprime mort-
gages. Subprime and near-prime loans 
shot up from 9 percent of newly origi-
nated securitized mortgages in 2001 to 
40 percent in 2006.1 
  The nonprime boom introduced 
practices that made it easier to obtain 
loans. Some mortgages required 
little or no proof of income; others 
needed little or no down payment. 
Homebuyers could take out a simulta-
neous second, or piggyback, mortgage 
at the time of purchase, make inter-
est-only payments for up to 15 years, 
Chart 1
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implicit government guarantee of them. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, however, 
haven’t packaged many nonprime 
mortgages into RMBS.
  Lacking the same perceived status, 
nonagency RMBS—those not issued by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie 
Mae—faced the hurdle of paying 
investors extremely large premiums to 
compensate them for high default risk. 
These high costs would have pushed 
nonprime interest rates to levels out-
side the reach of targeted borrowers.
  This is where financial innova-
tions came into play. Some—like col-
lateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
a common RMBS derivative—were 
designed to protect investors in 
nonagency securities against default 
losses. Such CDOs divide the streams 
of income that flow from the under-
lying mortgages into tranches that 
absorb default losses according to a 
preset priority. 
  The lowest-rated tranche absorbs 
the first defaults on the pool of 
underlying mortgages, with succes-
sively higher ranked and rated tranches 
absorbing any additional defaults. If 
defaults turn out to be low, there may 
be no losses for higher-ranked tranches 
to absorb. But if defaults are much 
greater than expected, even higher-
rated tranches may face losses. 
  Having confidence in the ability 
of quantitative models to accurately 
measure nonprime default risk, a brisk 
market emerged for securities backed 
by nonprime loans. The combination of 
new credit-scoring techniques and new 
nonagency RMBS products enabled 
nonprime-rated applicants to qualify 
for mortgages, opening a new chan-
nel for funds to flow from savers to a 
new class of borrowers in this decade 
(Chart 2, lower panel).
Nonprime Boom Unravels
  As problems began to emerge in 
late 2006, investors realized they had 
purchased nonprime RMBS with overly 
optimistic expectations of loan quality.2 
Much of their misjudgment plausibly 
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ing default losses based on the short 
history of nonprime loans. 
  Subprime loan problems had 
surfaced just before and at the start 
of the 2001 recession but then rapidly 
retreated from 2002 to 2005 as the 
economy recovered (Chart 3). This 
pre-2006 pattern suggested that as 
long as unemployment remained low, 
so, too, would default and delinquen-
cy rates. 
  This interpretation ignored two 
other factors that had helped alleviate 
subprime loan problems earlier in the 
decade. First, this was a period of rap-
idly escalating home prices. Subprime 
borrowers who encountered financial 
problems could either borrow against 
their equity to make house payments 
or sell their homes to settle their 
debts. Second, interest rates declined 
significantly in the early 2000s. This 
helped lower the base rate to which 
adjustable mortgage rates were 
indexed, thereby limiting the increase 
when initial, teaser rates ended. 
  Favorable home-price and interest 
rate developments likely led models 
that were overly focused on unem-
ployment as a driver of problem loans 
to underestimate the risk of nonprime 
mortgages. Indeed, swings in home-
price appreciation and interest rates 
may also explain why prime and 
subprime loan quality have trended 
together in the 2000s. This can be 
seen once we account for the fact 
that past-due rates—the percentage 
of mortgages delinquent or in some 
stage of foreclosure—typically run five 
times higher on subprime loans (Chart 
3). When the favorable home-price 
and interest rate factors reversed, the 
past-due rate rose markedly, despite 
continued low unemployment.
  Failure to appreciate the risks 
of nonprime loans prompted lenders 
to overly ease credit standards.3 The 
result was a huge jump in origination 
shares for subprime and near-prime 
mortgages.
  Compared with conventional 
prime loans in 2006, average down 
payments were lower, at 6 percent for 
subprime mortgages and 12 percent 
for near-prime loans.4 The relatively 
small down payments often entailed 
borrowers’ taking out piggyback loans 
to pay the portion of their home 
prices above the 80 percent covered 
by first-lien mortgages. 
  Another form of easing facilitated 
the rapid rise of mortgages that didn’t 
require borrowers to fully document 
their incomes. In 2006, these low- or 
no-doc loans comprised 81 percent of 
near-prime, 55 percent of jumbo, 50 
percent of subprime and 36 percent of 
prime securitized mortgages.
  The easier lending standards 
coincided with a sizeable rise in 
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). Of 
the mortgages originated in 2006 that 
were later securitized, 92 percent of 
subprime, 68 percent of near-prime, 
43 percent of jumbo and 23 percent 
of prime mortgages had adjustable 
rates. Now, with rates on one-year 
adjustable and 30-year fixed mort-
gages close, ARMs’ market share has 
dwindled to 15 percent, less than 
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  In early 2007, investors and lend-
ers began to realize the ramifications 
of credit-standard easing. Delinquency 
rates for 6-month-old subprime and 
near-prime loans underwritten in 2006 
were far higher than those of the same 
age originated in 2004. 
  Other signs of deterioration also 
surfaced. The past-due rate for out-
standing subprime mortgages rose 
sharply and neared the peak reached 
in 2002, with the deterioration much 
worse for adjustable- than fixed-rate 
mortgages. In first quarter 2007, the 
rate at which residential mortgages 
entered foreclosure rose to its fast-
est pace since tracking of these data 
began in 1970. 
  Lenders reacted to these signs 
by initially tightening credit standards 
more on riskier mortgages. In the 
Federal Reserve’s April 2007 survey 
of senior loan officers, 15 percent of 
banks indicated they had raised stan-
dards for mortgages to prime borrow-
ers in the prior three months, but a 
much higher 56 percent had done so 
for subprime mortgages. Responses to 
the July 2007 survey were similar.  
  However, in the October 2007 
survey the share of banks tightening 
standards on prime mortgages jumped 
to 41 percent, while 56 percent did 
so for subprime loans. Many nonbank 
lenders have also imposed tougher 
standards or simply exited the busi-
ness altogether. This likely reflects 
lenders’ response to the financial dis-
ruptions seen since last summer.
  The stricter standards meant fewer 
buyers could bid on homes, affecting 
prices for prime and subprime bor-
rowers alike. Foreclosures added to 
downward pressures on home prices 
by raising the supply of houses on 
the market. And after peaking in 
September 2005, single-family home 
sales fell in September 2007 to their 
lowest level since January 1998. 
  The number of unsold homes 
on the market has risen, sharply 
pushing up the inventory-to-sales 
ratio for existing single-family 
homes from their low in January 
2005 to their highest level since the 
start of this series in 1989 (Chart 
4). Condominium supply, which is 
reflected in the all-home numbers, has 
experienced an even sharper increase 
since early 2005.
  These high inventories will likely 
weigh on construction and home prices 
for months to come. After peaking in 
early 2005, the Standard & Poor’s/Case-
Shiller index of year-over-year home-
price appreciation in 10 large U.S. cities 
was down 5 percent in August—its big-
gest drop since 1991. While a Freddie 
Mac gauge of home prices posted a 
small year-over-year gain in the second 
quarter, the pace was dramatically off 
its highest rate, reported in third quar-
ter 2005 (Chart 5). 
  In the absence of home-price 
appreciation, many households are 
finding it difficult to refinance their 
way out of adjustable-rate mortgages 
obtained at the height of the hous-
ing boom. Larger mortgage payments 
could exacerbate delinquencies and 
foreclosures, especially with interest 
rate resets expected to remain high for 
the next year (Chart 6). This suggests 
mortgage quality will likely continue 
to fall off for some time. 
Financial Turmoil 
  By August 2007, the housing 
market’s weaknesses were apparent: 
loan-quality problems, uncertainty 
about inventories, interest rate resets 
and spillovers from weaker home pric-
es. These, coupled with ratings agen-
cies’ downgrading of many subprime 
RMBS, led to a dramatic thinning in 
trading for subprime credit instru-
ments, many of which carried synthet-
Chart 4
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ic, rather than market, values based 
on models because of the instruments’ 
illiquidity. 
  On Aug. 14, the paralysis in the 
capital markets led three investment 
funds to halt redemptions because 
they couldn’t reasonably calculate the 
prices at which their shares could be 
valued. This event triggered wide-
spread concern about the pricing of 
many new instruments, calling into 
question many financial firms’ mar-
ket values and disrupting the normal 
workings of the financial markets.
  Investors sought liquidity, putting 
upward pressure on overnight inter-
est rates and sparking a sharp upward 
repricing of risk premiums on assets, 
particularly those linked to nonprime 
mortgages. One outcome was an 
interest rate spike for both mortgage-
backed commercial paper and jumbo 
mortgages, which heightened financial 
market uncertainty. In this environ-
ment, nonagency RMBS were viewed 
as posing more liquidity and default 
risk than those packaged by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. 
  Facing greater perceived default 
risk, investors began demanding much 
higher risk premiums on jumbo mort-
gage securities, pushing up the cost  
of funding such loans via securitiza-
tion and encouraging lenders to incur 
the extra cost of holding more of 
these loans in their portfolios. This 
contributed to a 1 percentage point 
jump in jumbo interest rates between 
June and late August, an especially 
important increase given that jumbos 
accounted for about 12 percent of 
mortgage originations last year. 
  Although spreads between jumbo 
and conforming loan rates have fallen 
off their late-summer highs, they’re 
still elevated. The higher rates have 
dampened the demand for more 
expensive homes, just as tighter credit 
standards reduced the number of buy-
ers for lower-end homes. 
Macroeconomic Effects
  A housing slowdown mainly affects 
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housing construction and home-related 
spending. It also reins in spending 
by consumers who have less housing 
wealth against which to borrow.5
  Residential construction likely 
exerted its largest negative effect in 
third quarter 2006, when it subtracted 
1.3 percentage points from the annual 
pace of real GDP growth. Last year, 
many forecasts predicted home con-
struction would stop restraining GDP 
growth by the end of 2007 and the 
industry would start recovering in 
2008. These predictions were made 
before the tightening of nonprime 
credit standards began in late 2006. 
The change in standards will likely 
prolong the housing downturn and 
delay the recovery, although it’s hard 
to tell precisely for how long. Since 
single-family permits have already 
fallen 52 percent from their September 
2005 peak, however, the worst of the 
homebuilding drag may be behind us.
  The same may not be true for 
housing’s indirect effect on consump-
tion. Since the late 1990s, many 
homeowners have borrowed against 
housing wealth, using home equity 
lines of credit or cash-out refinancing 
or not fully rolling over capital gains 
on one house into a down payment or 
improvements on the next one. These 
mortgage equity withdrawals gave 
people access to lower cost, collateral-
ized loans, which bolstered spending 
on consumer goods. By one measure, 
these withdrawals were as large as 
6 to 7 percent of labor and transfer 
income in the early to mid-2000s. 
  The magnitude and timing of 
these withdrawals may have changed 
in hard-to-gauge ways. New research 
suggests housing wealth’s impact on 
consumer spending grew as recent 
financial innovations expanded the 
ability to tap housing equity.6 This 
is consistent with prior research on 
housing’s connection to U.S. consumer 
spending.7 Aside from the interest-
rate-related refinancing surge of 2002 
and 2003, mortgage equity-withdrawal 
movements have become increasingly 
sensitive to swings in home-price 
appreciation since a 1986 law granted 
a federal income tax deduction for 
home equity loans (Chart 7). 
  Compounding the uncertain out-
look for consumption is the likely 
reversal of the early 2000s’ mort-
gage credit liberalization.8 This will 
put further downward pressure on 
home prices and housing wealth and 
may curtail home equity loans and 
cash-out refinancings. Finally, the 
homebuying enabled by the easing of 
credit standards in recent years may 
have been at the expense of later 
sales, further dampening the market 
going forward. 
  The timing of housing wealth’s 
impact on consumption may have 
also changed. For example, before 
the advent of equity lines and cash-
out refinancings, housing wealth 
increases may have affected U.S. con-
sumption mainly by reducing home-
owners’ need to save for retirement. 
Since then, such financial innovations 
have enabled households to spend 
their equity gains before retirement. 
It’s unclear how much this may be 
reversed by the 2007 retrenchment in 
mortgage availability. 
Looking Ahead
  The rise and fall of nonprime 
mortgages has taken us into largely 
uncharted territory. Past behavior, 
however, suggests that housing mar-
kets’ adjustment to more realistic 
lending standards is likely to be pro-
longed.9
  One manifestation of the slow 
downward adjustment of home prices 
and construction activity is the mount-
ing level of unsold homes. The muted 
outlook for home-price appreciation, 
coupled with the resetting of many 
nonprime interest rates, suggests fore-
closures will increase for some time. 
  The sharp reversal of trends in 
home-price appreciation will also 
dampen consumer spending growth, an 
effect that may worsen if the pullback 
in mortgage availability limits people’s 
ability to borrow against their homes. 
  Although recent financial market 
turmoil will likely add to the housing 
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  First, the effect of slower home-
price gains on consumer spending is 
likely to be drawn out, giving mon-
etary policy time to adjust if necessary. 
  Second, the Federal Reserve has 
been successful in slowing core inflation 
while maintaining economic growth. 
This gives policymakers inflation-fight-
ing credibility, which enables them to 
coax down market interest rates should 
the economy need stimulus.
  Third, even if the tightening of 
mortgage credit standards undesirably 
slows aggregate demand, monetary 
policy could still, if need be, help offset 
the overall effect by stimulating the 
economy via lower interest rates. This 
would bolster net exports and business 
investment and help cushion the impact 
of higher risk premiums on the costs of 
financing for firms and households.10
DiMartino is an economics writer and Duca a 
vice president and senior policy advisor in the 
Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas.
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